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Abstract
This paper addresses the problem of learn-
ing a Nash equilibrium in γ-discounted mul-
tiplayer general-sum Markov Games (MGs)
in a batch setting. As the number of players
increases in MG, the agents may either col-
laborate or team apart to increase their final
rewards. One solution to address this prob-
lem is to look for a Nash equilibrium. Al-
though, several techniques were found for the
subcase of two-player zero-sum MGs, those
techniques fail to find a Nash equilibrium in
general-sum Markov Games. In this paper,
we introduce a new definition of ǫ-Nash equi-
librium in MGs which grasps the strategy’s
quality for multiplayer games. We prove
that minimizing the norm of two Bellman-
like residuals implies to learn such an ǫ-Nash
equilibrium. Then, we show that minimiz-
ing an empirical estimate of the Lp norm of
these Bellman-like residuals allows learning
for general-sum games within the batch set-
ting. Finally, we introduce a neural network
architecture that successfully learns a Nash
equilibrium in generic multiplayer general-
sum turn-based MGs.
1 Introduction
A Markov Game (MG) is a model for Multi-Agent
Reinforcement Learning (MARL) [Littman, 1994].
Chess, robotics or human-machine dialogues are a few
examples of the myriad of applications that can be
modeled by an MG. At each state of an MG, all
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agents have to pick an action simultaneously. As a
result of this mutual action, the game moves to an-
other state and each agent receives a reward. In
this paper, we focus on presently the most generic
MG framework with perfect information: general-sum
multiplayer MGs. This framework includes MDPs
(which are single agent MGs), zero-sum two-player
games, normal form games, extensive form games
and other derivatives [Nisan et al., 2007]. For in-
stance, general-sum multiplayer MGs have neither a
specific reward structure as opposed to zero-sum two-
player MGs [Shapley, 1953, Perolat et al., 2015] nor
state space constraints such as the tree structure in ex-
tensive form games [Nisan et al., 2007]. More impor-
tantly, when it comes to MARL, using classic models
of reinforcement learning (MDP or Partially Observ-
able MDP) assumes that the other players are part of
the environment. Therefore, other players have a sta-
tionary strategy and do not update it according to the
current player. General-sum multiplayer MGs remove
this assumption by allowing the agents to dynamically
re-adapt their strategy according the other players.
Therefore, they may either cooperate or to confront in
different states which entails joint-strategies between
the players.
In this paper, agents are not allowed to directly settle
a common strategy beforehand. They have to choose
their strategy secretly and independently to maximize
their cumulative reward.In game theory, this concept is
traditionally addressed by searching for a Nash equi-
librium [Filar and Vrieze, 2012]. Note that different
Nash equilibria may co-exist in a single MG. Com-
puting a Nash equilibrium in MGs requires a perfect
knowledge of the dynamics and the rewards of the
game. In most practical situations, the dynamics and
the rewards are unknown. To overcome this difficulty
two approaches are possible: Either learn the game by
interacting with other agents or extract information
from the game through a finite record of interactions
between the agents. The former is known as the online
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scenario while the latter is called the batch scenario.
This paper focuses on the batch scenario. Further-
more, when a player learns a strategy, he faces a rep-
resentation problem. In every state of the game (or
configuration), he has to store a strategy correspond-
ing to his goal. However, this approach does not scale
with the number of states and it prevents from gen-
eralizing a strategy from one state to another. Thus,
function approximation is introduced to estimate and
generalize the strategy.
First, the wider family of batch algo-
rithms applied to MDPs builds upon ap-
proximate value iteration [Riedmiller, 2005,
Munos and Szepesva´ri, 2008] or approximate policy
iteration [Lagoudakis and Parr, 2003]. Another family
relies on the direct minimization of the optimal Bell-
man residual [Baird et al., 1995, Piot et al., 2014b].
These techniques can handle value function ap-
proximation and have proven their efficacy in large
MDPs especially when combined with neural net-
works [Riedmiller, 2005]. The batch scenario is also
well studied for the particular case of zero-sum two-
player MGs. It can be solved with analogue techniques
as the ones for MDPs [Lagoudakis and Parr, 2002,
Perolat et al., 2015, Perolat et al., 2016]. All the pre-
viously referenced algorithms use the value function or
the state-action value function to compute the optimal
strategy. However, [Zinkevich et al., 2006] demon-
strates that no algorithm based on the value function
or on the state-action value function can be applied
to find a stationary-Nash equilibrium in general-sum
MGs. Therefore, recent approaches to find a Nash
equilibrium consider an optimization problem on
the strategy of each player [Prasad et al., 2015]
in addition to the value functions. Finding a
Nash equilibrium is well studied when the model
of the MG is known [Prasad et al., 2015] or es-
timated [Akchurina, 2010] or in the online sce-
nario [Littman, 2001, Prasad et al., 2015]. However,
none of the herein-before algorithms approximates
the value functions or the strategies. To our
knowledge, using function approximation to find a
Nash-equilibrium in MGs has not been attempted
before this paper.
The key contribution of this paper is to introduce a
novel approach to learn an ǫ-Nash equilibrium in a
general-summultiplayer MG in the batch setting. This
contribution relies on two ideas: the minimization of
two Bellman-like residuals and the definition of the
notion of weak ǫ-Nash equilibrium. Again, our ap-
proach is the first work that considers function ap-
proximation to find an ǫ-Nash equilibrium. As a sec-
ond contribution, we empirically evaluate our idea on
randomly generated deterministic MGs by designing a
neural network architecture. This network minimizes
the Bellman-like residuals by approximating the strat-
egy and the state-action value-function of each player.
These contributions are structured as follows: first, we
recall the definitions of an MG, of a Nash equilibrium
and we define a weaker notion of an ǫ-Nash equilib-
rium. Then, we show that controlling the sum of sev-
eral Bellman residuals allows us to learn an ǫ-Nash
equilibrium. Later, we explain that controlling the
empirical norm of those Bellman residuals addresses
the batch scenario problem. At this point, we pro-
vide a description of the NashNetwork. Finally, we
empirically evaluate our method on randomly gener-
ated MGs (Garnets). Using classic games would have
limited the scope of the evaluation. Garnets enable
to set up a myriad of relevant configuration and they
avoid drawing conclusion on our approach from spe-
cific games.
2 Background
In an N -player MG with a finite state space S all play-
ers take actions in a finite set ((Ai(s))s∈S)i∈{1,...,N}
depending on the player and on the state. In ev-
ery state s, each player has to take an action within
his/her action space ai ∈ Ai(s) and receives a re-
ward signal ri(s, a1, ..., aN ) which depends on the
joint action of all players in state s. Then, we as-
sume that the state changes according to a transi-
tion kernel p(s′|s, a1, ..., aN). All actions indexed by
−i are joint actions of all players except player i (i.e.
a-i = (a1, . . . , ai−1, ai+1, . . . , aN )). For the sake of
simplicity we will note a = (a1, . . . , aN) = (ai,a-i),
p(s′|s, a1, ..., aN ) = p(s′|s, a) = p(s′|s, ai,a-i) and
ri(s, a1, ..., aN) = ri(s, a) = ri(s, ai,a-i). The con-
stant γ ∈ [0, 1) is the discount factor.
In a MARL problem, the goal is typically to find a
strategy for each player (a policy in the MDP lit-
erature). A stationary strategy πi maps to each
state a distribution over the action space Ai(s). The
strategy πi(.|s) is such a distribution. Alike previ-
ously, we will write pi = (π1, ..., πN ) = (πi,pi-i) the
product distribution of those strategies (i.e. pi-i =
(π1, . . . , πi−1, πi+1, . . . , πN )). The stochastic kernel
defining the dynamics of the Markov Chain when
all players follow their strategy pi is Ppi(s′|s) =
Ea∼pi[p(s
′|s, a)] and the one defining the MDP when
all players but player i follow their strategy pi-i is
Ppi-i(s
′|s, ai) = Ea-i∼pi-i [p(s
′|s, a)]. The kernel Ppi
can be seen as a squared matrix of size the num-
ber of states|S|. Identically, we can define the aver-
aged reward over all strategies ripi(s) = Ea∼pi[r
i(s, a)]
and the averaged reward over all players but player i,
ri
pi-i
(s, ai) = Ea-i∼pi-i [r
i(s, a)]. Again, the reward ripi
can be seen as a vector of size |S|. Finally, the identity
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matrix is noted I.
Value of the joint strategy : For each state s, the
expected return considering each player plays his part
of the joint strategy pi is the γ-discounted sum of his
rewards [Prasad et al., 2015, Filar and Vrieze, 2012]:
v
i
pi(s) = E[
+∞∑
t=0
γ
t
r
i
pi(st)|s0 = s, st+1 ∼ Ppi(.|st)],
= (I − γPpi)
−1
r
i
pi.
The joint value of each player is the following: vpi =
(v1pi, ..., v
N
pi ). In the MG theory, two Bellman opera-
tors can be defined on the value function with respect
to player i. The first one is T ia v
i (s) = ri(s, a) +
γ
∑
s′∈S
p(s′|s, a)vi(s′). It represents the expected value
player i will get in state s if all players play the joint
action a and if the value for player i after one tran-
sition is vi. If we consider that instead of playing ac-
tion a every player plays according to a joint strat-
egy pi the Bellman operator to consider is T ipiv
i (s) =
Ea∼pi[T ia v
i (s)] = ripi(s) + γ
∑
s′∈S
Ppi(s′|s)vi(s′). As in
MDPs theory, this operator is a γ-contraction in L+∞-
norm [Puterman, 1994]. Thus, it admits a unique fixed
point which is the value for player i of the joint strat-
egy pi : vipi.
Value of the best response : When the strat-
egy pi-i of all players but player i is fixed, the prob-
lem is reduced to an MDP of kernel Ppi-i and re-
ward function ri
pi-i
. In this underlying MDP, the
optimal Bellman operator would be T ∗i
pi-i
vi (s) =
max
ai
Ea-i∼pi-i [T
i
ai,a-i
vi (s)] = max
ai
[ri
pi-i
(s, ai) +
γ
∑
s′∈S
Ppi-i(s
′|s, ai)vi(s′)]. The fixed point of this op-
erator is the value of a best response of player i
when all other players play pi-i and will be written
v∗i
pi-i
= max
p˜ii
vi
p˜ii,pi-i
.
3 Nash, ǫ-Nash and Weak ǫ-Nash
Equilibrium
A Nash equilibrium is a solution concept well de-
fined in game theory. It states that one player can-
not improve his own value by switching his strat-
egy if the other players do not vary their own
one [Filar and Vrieze, 2012]. The goal of this paper
is to find one strategy for players which is as close as
possible to a Nash equilibrium.
Definition 1. In an MG, a strategy pi is a Nash equi-
librium if: ∀i ∈ {1, ..., N}, vipi = v
∗i
pi-i
.
This definition can be rewritten with Bellman opera-
tors:
Definition 2. In an MG, a strategy pi is a Nash
equilibrium if ∃v such as ∀i ∈ {1, ..., N}, T ipiv
i =
vi and T ∗i
pi-i
vi = vi.
Proof. The proof is left in appendix A.
One can notice that, in the case of a single player MG
(or MDP), a Nash equilibrium is simply the optimal
strategy. An ǫ-Nash equilibrium is a relaxed solution
concept in game theory. When all players play an
ǫ-Nash equilibrium the value they will receive is at
most ǫ sub-optimal compared to a best response. For-
mally [Filar and Vrieze, 2012]:
Definition 3. In an MG, a strategy pi is an ǫ-Nash
equilibrium if:
∀i ∈ {1, ..., N}, vipi + ǫ ≥ v
∗i
pi-i
or ∀i ∈ {1, ..., N}, v∗i
pi-i
− vipi ≤ ǫ,
which is equivalent to:
∥∥∥∥∥v∗ipi-i − vipi∥∥s,∞
∥∥∥
i,∞
≤ ǫ.
Interestingly, when considering an MDP, the defi-
nition of an ǫ-Nash equilibrium is reduced to con-
trol the L+∞-norm between the value of the play-
ers’ strategy and the optimal value. However, it is
known that approximate dynamic programming algo-
rithms do not control a L+∞-norm but rather an Lp-
norm [Munos and Szepesva´ri, 2008] (we take the defi-
nition of the Lp-norm of [Piot et al., 2014b]). Using Lp
-norm is necessary for approximate dynamic program-
ming algorithms to use complexity bounds from learn-
ing theory [Piot et al., 2014b]. The convergence of
these algorithms was analyzed using supervised learn-
ing bounds in Lp-norm and thus guaranties are given
in Lp-norm [Scherrer et al., 2012]. In addition, Bell-
man residual approaches on MDPs also give guaranties
in Lp-norm [Maillard et al., 2010, Piot et al., 2014b].
Thus, we define a natural relaxation of the previous
definition of the ǫ-Nash equilibrium in Lp-norm which
is consistent with the existing work on MDPs.
Definition 4. In a MG, pi is a weak ǫ-Nash equilib-
rium if:
∥∥∥∥∥v∗ipi-i − vipi∥∥µ(s),p
∥∥∥
ρ(i),p
≤ ǫ.
One should notice that an ǫ-Nash equilibrium is a weak
ǫ-Nash equilibrium. Conversely, a weak ǫ-Nash equi-
librium is not always an ǫ-Nash equilibrium. Further-
more, both ǫ do not need to be equal. The notion of
weak ǫ-Nash equilibrium defines a performance crite-
rion to evaluate a strategy while seeking for a Nash
equilibrium. Thus, this definition has the great ad-
vantage to provide a convincing way to evaluate the
final strategy. In the case of an MDP, it states that
a weak ǫ-Nash equilibrium only consists in controlling
the difference in Lp-norm between the optimal value
and the value of the learned strategy. For an MG, this
criterion is an Lp-norm over players (i ∈ {1, . . . , N})
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of an Lp-norm over states (s ∈ S) of the difference be-
tween the value of the joint strategy pi for player i in
state s and of his best response against the joint strat-
egy pi-i. In the following, we consider that learning a
Nash equilibrium should result in minimizing the loss∥∥∥∥∥v∗ipi-i − vipi∥∥µ(s),p
∥∥∥
ρ(i),p
. For each player, we want to
minimize the difference between the value of his strat-
egy and a best response considering the strategy of
the other players is fixed. However, a direct minimiza-
tion of that norm is not possible in the batch setting
even for MDPs. Indeed, v∗i
pi-i
cannot be directly ob-
served and be used as a target. A common strategy
to alleviate this problem is to minimize a surrogate
loss. In MDPs, a possible surrogate loss is the optimal
Bellman residual ‖v − T ∗v‖µ,p (where µ is a distribu-
tion over states and T ∗ is the optimal Bellman opera-
tor for MDPs) [Piot et al., 2014b, Baird et al., 1995].
The optimal policy is then extracted from the learnt
optimal value (or Q-value in general). In the following
section, we extend this Bellman residual approach to
MGs.
4 Bellman Residual Minimization in
MGs
Optimal Bellman residual minimization is not straight-
forwardly extensible to MGs because multiplayer
strategies cannot be directly extracted from value
functions as shown in [Zinkevich et al., 2006]. Yet,
from Definition 2, we know that a joint strategy pi
is a Nash equilibrium if there exists v such that, for
any player i, vi is the value of the joint strategy pi
for player i (i.e. T ipiv
i = vi) and vi is the value of
the best response player i can achieve regarding the
opponent’s strategy pi-i (i.e. T ∗i
pi-i
vi = vi). We thus
propose to build a second Bellman-like residual opti-
mizing over the set of strategies so as to directly learn
an ǫ-Nash equilibrium. The first (traditional) resid-
ual (i.e.
∥∥T ∗i
pi-i
vi − vi
∥∥
ρ(i),p
) forces the value of each
player to be close to their respective best response
to every other player while the second residual (i.e.∥∥T ipivi − vi
∥∥
ρ(i),p
) will force every player to play the
strategy corresponding to that value.
One can thus wonder how close from a Nash-
Equilibrium pi would be if there existed v such that
T ∗i
pi-i
vi ≈ vi and T ipiv
i ≈ vi. In this section, we
prove that, if we are able to control over (v,pi) a sum
of the Lp-norm of the associated Bellman residuals
(
∥∥T ∗i
pi-i
vi − vi
∥∥
µ,p
and
∥∥T ipivi − vi∥∥µ,p), then we are able
to control
∥∥∥∥∥v∗ipi-i − vipi∥∥µ(s),p
∥∥∥
ρ(i),p
.
Theorem 1. ∀p, p′ positive reals such that 1
p
+ 1
p′
= 1
and ∀(v1, . . . , vN ):
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥v∗ipi-i − vipi∥∥∥
µ(s),p
∥∥∥∥
ρ(i),p
≤
2
1
p′ C∞(µ, ν)
1
p
1− γ
×
[
N∑
i=1
ρ(i)
(∥∥∥T ∗ipi-ivi − vi∥∥∥p
ν,p
+
∥∥∥T ipivi − vi∥∥∥p
ν,p
)] 1p
,
with the following concentrability coefficient (the norm
of a Radon-Nikodym derivative)
C∞(µ, ν, π
i,pi-i) =
∥∥∥∥ ∂µT (1−γ)(I−γPpii,pi-i )−1∂νT
∥∥∥∥
ν,∞
and
C∞(µ, ν) = suppi C∞(µ, ν, π
i,pi-i).
Proof. The proof is left in appendix B.
This theorem shows that an ǫ-Nash equilibrium can be
controlled by the sum over the players of the sum of
the norm of two Bellman-like residuals: the Bellman
Residual of the best response of each player and the
Bellman residual of the joint strategy. If the residual
of the best response of player i (
∥∥T ∗i
pi-i
vi − vi
∥∥p
ν,p
) is
small, then the value vi is close to the value of the
best response v∗i
pi-i
and if the Bellman residual of the
joint strategy
∥∥T ipivi − vi
∥∥p
ν,p
for player i is small, then
vi is close to vipi. In the end, if all those residuals are
small, the joint strategy is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium with
ǫ small since v∗i
pi-i
≃ vi ≃ vipi.
Theorem 1 also emphasizes the necessity of a weakened
notion of an ǫ-Nash equilibrium. It is much easier to
control a Lp-norm than a L∞-norm with samples. In
the following, the weighted sum of the norms of the
two Bellman residuals will be noted as:
fν,ρ,p(pi,v) =
N∑
i=1
ρ(i)
(∥∥T ∗i
pi-i
vi − vi
∥∥p
ν,p
+
∥∥T ipivi − vi∥∥pν,p
)
.
Finding a Nash equilibrium is then reduced to a non-
convex optimization problem. If we can find a (pi,v)
such that fν,ρ,p(pi,v) = 0, then the joint strategy pi is
a Nash equilibrium. This procedure relies on a search
over the joint value function space and the joint strat-
egy space.Besides, if the state space or the number
of joint actions is too large, the search over values
and strategies might be intractable. We addressed the
issue by making use of approximate value functions
and strategies. Actually, Theorem 1 can be extended
with function approximation. A good joint strategy
piθ within an approximate strategy space Π can still
be found by computing piθ,vη ∈ argmin
θ, η
fν,ρ,p(piθ,vη)
(where θ and η respectively parameterize piθ,vη).
Even with function approximation, the learned joint
strategy piθ would be at least a weak ǫ-Nash equilib-
rium (with ǫ ≤ 2
1
p′ C∞(µ,ν)
1
p
1−γ
fν,ρ,p(piθ,vη)).This is, to
our knowledge, the first approach to solve MGs within
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an approximate strategy space and an approximate
value function space.
5 The Batch Scenario
In this section, we explain how to learn a weak ǫ-Nash
equilibrium from Theorem 1 with approximate strate-
gies and an approximate value functions. As said pre-
viously, we will focus on the batch setting where only
a finite number of historical data sampled from an MG
are available.
In the batch scenario, it is common to work on state-
action value functions (also named Q-functions). In
MDPs, the Q-function is defined on the state and
the action of one agent. In MGs, the Q-function
has to be extended over the joint action of the
agents [Perolat et al., 2015, Hu and Wellman, 2003].
Thus, the Q-function in MGs for a fixed joint strat-
egy pi is the expected γ-discounted sum of rewards
considering that the players first pick the joint action
a and follow the joint strategy pi. Formally, the Q-
function is defined as Qipi(s, a) = T
i
a v
i
pi. Moreover, one
can define two analogue Bellman operators to the ones
defined for the value function:
BipiQ (s,a) = r
i(s,a) +
∑
s′∈S
p(s′|s, a)Eb∼pi[Q(s
′
,b)]
B∗ipi Q (s,a) = r
i(s,a)+∑
s′∈S
p(s′|s,a)max
bi
[
Eb-i∼pi-i [Q(s
′
, b
i
, b
-i)]
]
.
As for the value function, Qipi is the fixed point of
Bipi and Q
∗i
pi-i
is the fixed point of B∗ipi (where Q
∗i
pi-i
=
max
pii
Qipi). The extension of Theorem 1 to Q-functions
instead of value functions is straightforward. Thus, we
will have to minimize the following function depending
on strategies and Q-functions:
f(Q,pi) =
N∑
i=1
ρ(i)
(∥∥∥B∗ipi-iQi −Qi∥∥∥p
ν,p
+
∥∥∥BipiQi −Qi∥∥∥p
ν,p
)
(1)
The batch scenario consists in having a set of k samples
(sj , (a
1
j , ..., a
N
j ), (r
1
j , ..., r
N
j ), s
′
j)j∈{1,...,k} where r
i
j =
ri(sj , a
1
j , ..., a
N
j ) and where the next state is sampled
according to p(.|sj , a1j , ..., a
N
j ). From Equation (1), we
can minimize the empirical-norm by using the k sam-
ples to obtain the empirical estimator of the Bellman
residual error.
f˜k(Q,pi) =
k∑
j=1
N∑
i=1
ρ(i)
[ ∣∣∣B∗ipi-iQi(sj ,aj)−Qi(sj , aj)∣∣∣p
+
∣∣∣BipiQi(sj ,aj)−Qi(sj ,aj)∣∣∣p
]
, (2)
For more details, an extensive analysis beyond the
minimization of the Bellman residual in MDPs
can be found in [Piot et al., 2014b]. In the fol-
lowing we discuss the estimation of the two
Bellman residuals
∣∣B∗i
pi-i
Qi(sj ,aj)−Q
i(sj ,aj)
∣∣pand∣∣BipiQi(sj ,aj)−Qi(sj , aj)∣∣pin different cases.
Deterministic Dynamics: With deterministic dy-
namics, the estimation is straightforward. We es-
timate BipiQ
i(sj ,aj) with rij + γEb∼pi[Q
i(s′j ,b)] and
B∗i
pi-i
Qi(sj ,aj) with rij + γmax
bi
[
Eb-i∼pi-i [Q
i(s′j , b
i, b-i)]
]
,
where the expectation are:
Eb∼pi[Q
i(s′,b)] =∑
b1∈A1
· · ·
∑
bN∈AN
π
1(b1|s′) . . . πN(bN |s′)Qi(s′, b1, . . . , bN )
and where
Eb-i∼pi-i [Q
i(s′, bi, b-i)] =
∑
b1∈A1
· · ·
∑
bi−1∈Ai−1
∑
bi+1∈Ai+1
. . .
∑
bN∈AN
π
1(b1|s′) . . . πi−1(bi−1|s′)πi+1(bi+1|s′) . . .
× πN(bN |s′)Qi(s′, b1, . . . , bN )
Please note that this computation can be turned into
tensor operations as described in Appendix-C.
Stochastic Dynamics: In the case of stochastic dy-
namics, the previous estimator (1) is known to be bi-
ased [Maillard et al., 2010, Piot et al., 2014b]. If the
dynamic is known, one can use the following unbi-
ased estimator: BipiQ
i(sj ,aj) is estimated with rij +
γ
∑
s′∈S
p(s′|sj ,aj)Eb∼pi[Q
i(s′,b)] and B∗i
pi-i
Qi(sj ,aj) with
rij + γ
∑
s′∈S
p(s′|sj ,aj)max
bi
[
Eb-i∼pi-i [Q
i(s′, bi, b-i)]
]
.
If the dynamic of the game is not known (e.g. batch
scenario), the unbiased estimator cannot be used since
the kernel of the MG is required and other tech-
niques must be applied. One idea would be to
first learn an approximation of this kernel. For in-
stance, one could extend the MDP techniques to MGs
such as embedding a kernel in a Reproducing Ker-
nel Hilbert Space (RKHS) [Grunewalder et al., 2012,
Piot et al., 2014a, Piot et al., 2014b] or using kernel
estimators [Taylor and Parr, 2012, Piot et al., 2014b].
Therefore, p(s′|sj ,aj) would be replaced by an es-
timator of the dynamics p˜(s′|sj ,aj) in the previous
equation. If a generative model is available, the issue
can be addressed with double sampling as discussed
in [Maillard et al., 2010, Piot et al., 2014b].
6 Neural Network architecture
Minimizing the sum of Bellman residuals is a challeng-
ing problem as the objective function is not convex. It
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is all the more difficult as both the Q-value function
and the strategy of every player must be learned in-
dependently. Nevertheless, neural networks have been
able to provide good solutions to problems that require
minimizing non-convex objective such as image clas-
sification or speech recognition [LeCun et al., 2015].
Furthermore, neural networks were successfully ap-
plied to reinforcement learning to approximate the
Q-function [Mnih et al., 2015] in one agent MGs with
eclectic state representation.
Here, we introduce a novel neural architecture: the
NashNetwork1. For every player, a two-fold network is
defined: the Q-network that learns a Q-value function
and a π-network that learns the stochastic strategy of
the players. The Q-network is a multilayer perceptron
which takes the state representation as input. It out-
puts the predicted Q-values of the individual action
such as the network used by [Mnih et al., 2015]. Iden-
tically, the π-network is also a multilayer perceptron
which takes the state representation as input. It out-
puts a probability distribution over the action space
by using a softmax. We then compute the two Bell-
man residuals for every player following Equation 5.
Finally, we back-propagate the error by using classic
gradient descent operations.
In our experiments, we focus on deterministic turn-
based games. It entails a specific neural architecture
that is fully described in Figure 6. During the train-
ing phase, all the Q-networks and the π-networks of
the players are used to minimize the Bellman resid-
ual. Once the training is over, only the π-network is
kept to retrieve the strategy of each player. Note that
this architecture differs from classic actor-critic net-
works [Lillicrap et al., 2016] for several reasons. Al-
though Q-network is an intermediate support to the
computation of π-network, neither policy gradient nor
advantage functions are used in our model. Besides,
the Q-network is simply discarded at the end of the
training. The NashNetwork directly searches in the
strategy space by minimizing the Bellman residual.
7 Experiments
In this section, we report an empirical evalua-
tion of our method on randomly generated MGs.
This class of problems has been first described
by [Archibald et al., 1995] for MDPs and has been
studied for the minimization of the optimal Bell-
man residual [Piot et al., 2014b] and in zero-sum two-
player MGs [Perolat et al., 2016]. First, we extend
the class of randomly generated MDPs to general-sum
MGs, then we describe the training setting, finally we
analyze the results. Without loss of generality we fo-
1https://github.com/fstrub95/nash_network
cus on deterministic turn-based MGs for practical rea-
sons. Indeed, in simultaneous games the complexity
of the state actions space grows exponentially with
the number of player whereas in turn-based MGs it
only grows linearly. Besides, as in the case of simul-
taneous actions, a Nash equilibrium in a turn-based
MG (even deterministic) might be a stochastic strat-
egy [Zinkevich et al., 2006]. In a turn-based MG, only
one player can choose an action in each state. Finally,
we run our experiments on deterministic MGs to avoid
bias in the estimator as discussed in Sec.5.
To sum up, we use turn-based games to avoid the ex-
ponential growth of the number of actions and deter-
ministic games to avoid bias in the estimator. The
techniques described in Sec.5 could be implemented
with a slight modification of the architecture described
in Sec.6.
Dataset: We chose to use artificially generated MGs
(named Garnet) to evaluate our method as they are
not problem dependent. They have the great advan-
tage to allow to easily change the state space (and its
underlying structure), the action space and the num-
ber of players. Furthermore, Garnets have the prop-
erty to present all the characteristics of a complete
MG. Standard games such as ”rock-paper-scissors” (no
states and zero-sum), or other games such as chess
or checkers (deterministic and zero-sum), always rely
on a limited number of MG properties. Using classic
games would thus have hidden the generality of our
approach even though it would have been more ap-
pealing. Finally, the underlying model of the dynam-
ics of the Garnet is fully known. Thus, it is possible to
investigate whether an ǫ-Nash equilibrium have been
reached during the training and to quantify the ǫ. It
would have been impossible to do so with more com-
plex games.
An N -player Garnet is described by a tuple (NS , NA).
The constantNS is the number of states and NA is the
number of actions of the MG. For each state and action
(s, a), we randomly pick the next state s′ in the neigh-
borhood of indices of s where s′ follow a rounded nor-
mal distribution N (s, σˆs′ ). We then build the transi-
tion matrix such as p(s′|s, a) = 1. Next, we enforce an
arbitrary reward structure into the Garnet to enable
the emergence of an Nash equilibrium. Each player i
has a random critical state sˆi and the reward of this
player linearly decreases by the distance (encoded by
indices) to his critical state. Therefore, the goal of
the player is to get as close as possible from his criti-
cal state. Some players may have close critical states
and may act together while other players have to fol-
low opposite directions. A Gaussian noise of standard
deviation σˆnoise is added to the reward, then we spar-
sify it with a ratio mnoise to harden the task. Finally,
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Figure 1: (top) Evolution of the Error vs Best Response during the training for a given Garnet. In both cases,
players manage to iteratively improve their strategies. A strong drop may occur when one of the player finds
a important move. (middle) Empirical Bellman residual for the training dataset and the testing dataset. It
highlights the link between minimizing the Bellman residual and the quality of the learned strategy. (bottom)
Average Error vs Best Response averaged over every players, Garnets and every batch. It highlights the ro-
bustness of minimizing the Bellman residual over several games. Experiments are run on 5 Garnets which is
re-sampled 5 times to average the metrics.
a player is selected uniformly over {1, . . . , N} for ev-
ery state once for all. The resulting vector vc encodes
which player plays at each state as it is a turn-based
game. Concretely, a Garnet works as follows: Given a
state s, a player is first selected according the vector
vc(s). This player then chooses an action according
its strategy πi. Once the action is picked, every player
i receives its individual reward ri(s, a). Finally, the
game moves to a new state according p(s′|s, a) and a
new state’s player (vc(s
′)). Again, the goal of each
player is to move as close as possible to its critical
state. Thus, players benefit from choosing the action
that maximizes its cumulative reward and leads to a
state controlled by a non-adversarial player.
Finally, samples (s, (a1, . . . , aN), (r1, . . . , rN ), s′) are
generated by randomly selecting a state and an action
uniformly. The reward, the next state, and the next
player are selected according to the model described
above.
Evaluation: Our goal is to verify whether the-joint
strategy of the players is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium. To
do so, we first retrieve the strategy of every player by
evaluating the πi-networks over the state space. Then,
given pi, we can exactly evaluate the value of the joint
strategy vipi for each player i and the value of the best
response to the strategy of the others v∗i
pi-i
. To do
so, the value vipi is computed by inverting the linear
system vipi = (I − γPpi)
−1ripi. The value v
∗i
pi-i
is com-
puted with the policy iteration algorithm. Finally, we
compute the Error vs Best Response for every player
defined as
‖vipi−v∗ipi-i‖2∥
∥
∥v∗i
pi-i
∥
∥
∥
2
. If this metric is close to zero
for all players, the players reach a weak ǫ-Nash equi-
librium with ǫ close to zero. Actually, Error vs Best
Response is a normalized quantification of how sub-
optimal the player’s strategy is compared to his best
response. It indicates by which margin a player would
have been able to increase his cumulative rewards by
improving his strategy while other players keep playing
the same strategies. If this metric is close to zero for all
players, then they have little incentive to switch from
their current strategy. It is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium. In
addition, we keep track of the empirical norm of the
Bellman residual on both the training dataset and the
test dataset as it is our training objective.
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Training parameters: We use N -player Garnet
with 1, 2 or 5 players. The state space and the action
space are respectively of size 100 and 5. The state is
encoded by a binary vector. The transition kernel is
built with a standard deviation σˆs′ of 1. The reward
function is ri(s) = 2min(|s−sˆ
i|,NS)−|s−sˆ
i|)
NS
(it is a cir-
cular reward function). The reward sparsity mnoise is
set to 0.5 and the reward white noise σˆnoise has a stan-
dard deviation of 0.05. The discount factor γ is set to
0.9. The Q-networks and π-networks have one hidden
layers of size 80 with RELUs [Goodfellow et al., 2016].
Q-networks have no output transfer function while π-
networks have a softmax. The gradient descent is per-
formed with AdamGrad [Goodfellow et al., 2016] with
an initial learning rate of 1e-3 for the Q-network and
5e-5 for the π-networks. We use a weight decay of
1e-6. The training set is composed of 5NSNA sam-
ples split into random minibatch of size 20 while the
testing dataset contains NSNA samples. The neural
network is implemented by using the python frame-
work Tensorflow [Abadi et al., 2015]. The source code
is available on Github (Hidden for blind review) to run
the experiments.
Results: Results for 1 player (MDP) and 5 players
are reported in Figure 1. Additional settings are re-
ported in the Appendix-C such as the two-player case
and the tabular cases. In those scenarios, the qual-
ity of the learned strategies converges in parallel with
the empirical Bellman residual. Once the training is
over, the players can increase their cumulative reward
by no more than 8% on average over the state space.
Therefore, neural networks succeed in learning a weak
ǫ-Nash equilibrium. Note that it is impossible to reach
a zero error as (i) we are in the batch setting, (ii) we
use function approximation and (iii) we only control a
weak ǫ-Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the quality of the
strategies are well-balanced among the players as the
standard deviation is below 5 points.
Our neural architecture has good scaling properties.
First, scaling from 2 players to 5 results in the same
strategy quality. Furthermore, it can be adapted to a
wide variety of problems by only changing the bottom
of each network to fit with the state representation of
the problem.
Discussions: The neural architecture faces some
over-fitting issues. It requires a high number
of samples to converge as described on Figure 2.
[Lillicrap et al., 2016] introduces several tricks that
may improve the training. Furthermore, we run addi-
tional experiments on non-deterministic Garnets but
the result remains less conclusive. Indeed, the estima-
tors of the Bellman residuals are biased for stochastic
dynamics. As discussed, embedding the kernel or us-
ing kernel estimators may help to estimate properly
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Figure 2: Impact of the number of samples on the
quality of the learned strategy. The number of sam-
ples per batch is computed by Nsamples = αNANS .
Experiments are run on 3 different Garnets which are
re-sampled 3 times to average the metrics.
the cost function (Equation (2)). Finally, our algo-
rithm only seeks for a single Nash-Equilibrium when
several equilibria might exist. Finding a specific equi-
librium among others is out of the scope of this paper.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a novel approach to learn a
Nash equilibrium in MGs. The contributions of this
paper are both theoretical and empirical. First, we
define a new (weaker) concept of an ǫ-Nash equilib-
rium. We prove that minimizing the sum of different
Bellman residuals is sufficient to learn a weak ǫ-Nash
equilibrium. From this result, we provide empirical es-
timators of these Bellman residuals from batch data.
Finally, we describe a novel neural network architec-
ture, called NashNetwork, to learn a Nash equilibrium
from batch data. This architecture does not rely on a
specific MG. It also scales to a high number of players.
Thus it can be applied to a trove of applications.
As future works, the NashNetwork could be extended
to more eclectic games such as simultaneous games
(i.e. Alesia [Perolat et al., 2015] or a stick together
game such as in [Prasad et al., 2015]) or Atari’s games
with several players such as Pong or Bomber. Addi-
tional optimization methods can be studied to this spe-
cific class of neural networks to increase the quality of
learning. Moreover, the Q-function and the strategy
could be parametrised with other classes of function
approximation such as trees. Yet, it requires to study
functional gradient descent on the loss function. And
finally, future work could explore the use of projected
Bellman residual as studied in MDPs and two-player
zero-sum MGs [Pe´rolat et al., 2016]
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A Proof of the equivalence of definition 1 and 2
Proof of the equivalence between definition 2 and 1.
(2) ⇒ (1):
If ∃v such as ∀i ∈ {1, ..., N}, T ipiv
i = vi and T ∗i
pi-i
vi = vi, then ∀i ∈ {1, ..., N}, vi = vi
pii,pi-i
and vi = max
pii
vi
p˜ii,pi-i
(1) ⇒ (2):
if ∀i ∈ {1, ..., N}, vi
pii,pi-i
= max
p˜ii
vi
p˜ii,pi-i
., then ∀i ∈ {1, ..., N}, the value vi = vi
pii,pi-i
is such as T ipiv
i =
vi and T ∗i
pi-i
vi = vi
B Proof of Theorem 1
First we will prove the following lemma. The proof is strongly inspired by previous work on the minimization of
the Bellman residual for MDPs [Piot et al., 2014b].
Lemma 1. let p and p′ be a real numbers such that 1
p
+ 1
p′
= 1, then ∀v,pi and ∀i ∈ {1, ..., N}:
∥∥∥vipii
∗
,pi-i − v
i
pii,pi-i
∥∥∥
µ,p
≤
1
1− γ
(
C∞(µ, ν, π
i
∗,pi
-i)
p′
p + C∞(µ, ν, π
i
,pi
-i)
p′
p
) 1
p′
[∥∥∥T ∗ipi-ivi − vi∥∥∥p
µ,p
+
∥∥∥T ipivi − vi∥∥∥p
µ,p
] 1
p
,
where πi∗ is the best response to pi
-i. Meaning vi
pii
∗
,pi-i
is the fixed point of T ∗i
pi-i
. And with the following concen-
trability coefficient C∞(µ, ν, πi,pi-i) =
∥∥∥∥∂µT (1−γ)(I−γPpii,pi-i )−1∂νT
∥∥∥∥
ν,∞
.
Proof. The proof uses similar techniques as in [Piot et al., 2014b]. First we have:
vipii,pi-i − v
i = (I − γPpii,pi-i)
−1(ripii,pi-i − (I − γPpii,pi-i)v
i),
= (I − γPpii,pi-i)
−1(T ipii,pi-iv
i − vi).
But we also have:
vipii
∗
,pi-i − v
i = (I − γPpii
∗
,pi-i)
−1(T ipii
∗
,pi-iv
i − vi),
then:
vipii
∗
,pi-i − v
i
pii,pi-i = v
i
pii
∗
,pi-i − v
i + vi − vipii,pi-i ,
= (I − γPpii
∗
,pi-i)
−1(T ipii
∗
,pi-iv
i − vi)− (I − γPpii,pi-i)
−1(T ipii,pi-iv
i − vi),
≤ (I − γPpii
∗
,pi-i)
−1(T ∗ipi-iv
i − vi)− (I − γPpii,pi-i)
−1(T ipii,pi-iv
i − vi),
≤ (I − γPpii
∗
,pi-i)
−1
∣∣T ∗ipi-ivi − vi
∣∣+ (I − γPpii,pi-i)−1
∣∣∣T ipii,pi-ivi − vi
∣∣∣ .
Finally, using the same technique as the one in [Piot et al., 2014b], we get:
∥∥∥vipii
∗
,pi-i − v
i
pii,pi-i
∥∥∥
µ,p
≤
∥∥(I − γPpii
∗
,pi-i)
−1
∣∣T ∗ipi-ivi − vi
∣∣∥∥
µ,p
+
∥∥∥(I − γPpii,pi-i)−1
∣∣∣T ipii,pi-ivi − vi
∣∣∣
∥∥∥
µ,p
,
≤
1
1− γ
[
C∞(µ, ν, π
i
∗,pi
-i)
1
p
∥∥T ∗ipi-ivi − vi
∥∥
ν,p
+ C∞(µ, ν, π
i,pi-i)
1
p
∥∥T ∗ipi-ivi − vi
∥∥
ν,p
]
,
≤
1
1− γ
(
C∞(µ, ν, π
i
∗,pi
-i)
p′
p + C∞(µ, ν, π
i,pi-i)
p′
p
) 1
p′
[∥∥T ∗ipi-ivi − vi
∥∥p
ν,p
+
∥∥T ipivi − vi
∥∥p
ν,p
] 1
p
.
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Theorem 1 falls in two steps:∥∥∥∥∥
∥∥∥∥max
p˜ii
vp˜ii,pi-i − v
i
pi
∥∥∥∥
µ(s),p
∥∥∥∥∥
ρ(i),p
≤
1
1− γ
[
max
i∈{1,...,N}
(
C∞(µ, ν, π
i
∗,pi
-i)
p′
p + C∞(µ, ν, π
i
,pi
-i)
p′
p
) 1
p′
]
×
[
N∑
i=1
ρ(i)
(∥∥∥T ∗ipi-ivi − vi∥∥∥p
ν,p
+
∥∥∥T ipivi − vi∥∥∥p
ν,p
)] 1p
,
≤
2
1
p′ C∞(µ, ν)
1
p
1− γ
[
N∑
i=1
ρ(i)
(∥∥∥T ∗ipi-ivi − vi∥∥∥p
ν,p
+
∥∥∥T ipivi − vi∥∥∥p
ν,p
)] 1p
,
with C∞(µ, ν) =
(
sup
pii,pi-i
C∞(µ, ν, π
i,pi-i)
)
The first inequality is proven using lemma 1 and Holder inequality. The second inequality falls noticing
∀πi,pi-i, C∞(µ, ν, πi,pi-i) ≤ sup
pii,pi-i
C∞(µ, ν, π
i,pi-i).
C Additional curves
This section provides additional curves regarding the training of the NashNetwork.
Figure 3: (top) Evolution of the Error vs Best Response during the training for a given Garnet. (middle)
Empirical Bellman residual for the training dataset and the testing dataset. (bottom) Average Error vs Best
Response averaged over every players, Garnets and every batch. Experiments are run on 5 Garnets which is
re-sampled 5 times to average the metrics.
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Figure 4: Tabular basis. One may notice that the tabular case works well for a 1 player game (MDP). Yet, the
more players there are, the worth it performs. Experiments are run on 5 Garnets which is re-sampled 5 times to
average the metrics.
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Figure 5: (left)Evolution of the Error vs Best Response during the training for a given Garnet. When the
Garnet has a complex structure or the batch is badly distributed, one player sometimes fails to learn a good
strategy. (right) Distribution of actions in the strategy among the players with the highest probability. This
plots highlights that π-networks do modify the strategy during the training
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Figure 6: NashNetwork. This scheme summarizes the neural architecture that learns a Nash equilibrium
by minimizing the Bellman residual for turn-based games. Each player has two networks : a Q-network
that learns a state-action value function and a π-network that learns the strategy of the player. The final
loss is an empirical estimate of the sum of Bellman residuals given a batch of data of the following shape
(s, (a1, . . . , aN ), (r1, . . . , rN ), s′). The equation (2) can be divided into key operations that are described below.
For each player i : first of all, in (A.0) we compute Qi(s, a1, . . . , aN ) by computing the tensor Qi(s,a) and then
by selecting the value of Qi(s,a) (A.1) given the action of the batch. Step (B) computes the tensor Qi(s′, b)
and step (C.0) computes the strategy πi(.|s′). In all Bellman residuals we need to average over the strategy
of players Qi(s′, b). Since we focus on turn-based MGs, we will only average over the strategy of the player
controlling next state s′ (in the following, this player is called the next player). In (C.1) we select the strategy
π(.|s′) of the next player given the batch. In (C.2) we duplicate the strategy of the next player for all other
players. In (D) we compute the dot product between the Qi(s′, b) and the strategy of the next player to obtain
Eb∼pi[Q
i(s′,b)] and in (E) we pick the highest expected rewards and obtain max
b
Qi(s′, b). Step (F) aims at
computing max
bi
[
Eb-i∼pi-i [Q
i(s′, bi, b-i)]
]
and, since we deal with a turn-based MG, we need to select between
the output of (D) or (E) according to the next player. For all i, we either select the one coming from (E)
if the next player is i or the one from (D) otherwise. In (G) we compute the error between the reward ri to
Qi(s, a)− γmax
bi
[
Eb-i∼pi-i [Q
i(s′, bi, b-i)]
]
and in (H) between ri and γEb∼pi[Q
i(s′,b)]−Qi(s, a). The final loss
is the sum of all the residuals.
